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Benjamin: Constitutional Law: Extent of Procedural Due Process Required to

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EXTENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS REQUIRED TO ADJUDGE THE COMPETENCY OF A
CONDEMNED PRISONER
Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986)

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.'
While incarcerated, petitioner exhibited a deteriorated mental state. 2 Florida
prohibits the execution of a prisoner when adjudged incompetent by the Governor.3 Therefore, pursuant to Florida law4 the Governor impaneled three psychiatric experts to evaluate petitioner. 5 The experts found petitioner competent
to be executed. 6 The Governor agreed and signed petitioner's death warrant. 7
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in United States District Court,
asserting the right to an evidentiary hearing concerning his sanity.' The District
Court denied a hearing 9 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial.' On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals." The Court HELD, petitioner had an eighth

1. 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2598 (1986).
2. Id. at 2598-99. Petitioner "believed the prison guards were part of a conspiracy to kill
people and hide the bodies in the prison." Id. The delusions continued until petitioner believed
135 of his friends and family were being held as captives in the prison. Petitioner also began
speaking in an incomprehensible code making statements such as " 'Hands, one, face one. Mafia
one. God one, father one, Pope one.' " Id.
3. FLA. STAT § 922.07(l)-(3) (1985) provides:
(I) When the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of death may be
insane, he shall stay execution . . . and appoint a commission of three psychiatrists to
examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify the psychiatrists in writing that
they are to examine the convicted person to determine whether he understands the nature
and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed on him. The examination
... shall take place with all three psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for the
convicted person and the state attorney may be present at the examination....
(2) After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor decides that the
convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty
and the reasons why it was imposed on him, he shall issue a warrant to the warden
directing him to execute the sentence at a time designated in the warrant.
(3) If the Governor decides that the convicted person does not have the mental capacity
to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed on him, he shall
have him committed to a Department of Corrections mental health treatment facility.
Id.
4. Id. § 922.07 (1).
5. 106 S. Ct. at 2599.
6. Id. One psychiatrist concluded petitioner had psychosis with paranoia but could understand
the nature of the death penalty. Another psychiatrist found petitioner was psychotic but understood
the situation. The third doctor concluded petitioner had an adaptational disorder but was aware
of what was happening. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.at 2606.
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amendment right to defer execution while insane,12 and the Florida evaluation
procedure was unconstitutional because it failed to provide a full and fair hearing
13
on the sanity issue.
Before the instant case, the United States Supreme Court had never required
a state's competency procedure to meet constitutional procedural due process
guidelines. 4 At common law, the court having jurisdiction over a condemned
prisoner decided issues of the prisoner's post-conviction sanity1s Some states
adopted the common law procedure while others allowed various public officials
to hear post-conviction claims. 16 The Supreme Court has upheld state procedures
that allow the sheriff,,7 the state governor, 8 or the prison warden"9 to determine
whether a condemned prisoner is competent to be executed.
In Solesbee v. Balkcom,20 the Supreme Court upheld a state procedure that
gave the Governor authority to decide the competency of a condemned prisoner.2' The governor appointed three physicians, who examined the petitioner
and declared him sane.2 2 After exhausting all state remedies, the prisoner appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that execution of the insane
is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the eighth amendment. 21 The
Solesbee Court rejected this contention because the eighth amendment had not
yet been applied to the states.2 4 According to the Court, an insane prisoner
had no constitutional right to defer execution while insane.25 The Court reasoned

12. Id. at 2602.
13. Id. at 2606. The Court found that the Florida procedure failed to provide a factfinding
procedure adequate to afford a full and fair hearing as required by 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(2) and
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Townsend court held that in a habeas corpus proceeding
the federal district court must grant an evidentiary hearing if the state court's factfinding procedure
was not a full and fair hearing. 372 U.S. at 313.
14. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897) (the manner of determining a condemned
prisoner's sanity is a legislative matter); see also infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
15. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 407 (1897) (the trial judge had the discretion to
call another jury to determine sanity). See generally Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J.
533, 538 (1979); Ward, Competency for Execution:a Problems in Law and Psychiaty, 14 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 35, 73 (1986).
16. For a list of state statutes, see Note, supra note 15, at 538 nn.29-31 and Ward, supra
note 15, at 73 nn.213-16.
17. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 402 (1897).
18. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 10 (1950).
19. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 550 (1958) (per curiam).
20. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
21. Id. at 10. The Solesbee court cited GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602:
Upon satisfactory evidence being offered to the Governor that the person convicted of a
capital offense has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor may, within
his discretion, have said person examined by such expert physicians as the Governor may
choose; and said physicians shall report to the Governor the result of their investigation;
and the Governor may, if he shall determine that the person convicted has become insane,
have the power of committing him . . . until his sanity has been restored.
339 U.S. at 10 n.l.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 10-11.
24. Id. at 11. The eighth amendment was not applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause until Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1961).
25. 339 U.S. at 10-11.
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the right was not required because insanity deferrals are discretionary by nature, 26 executive and administrative officials are neutral, 27 and there is a potential
for false insanity claims and deliberate execution delays. 28 Analogizing deferrals
to sentence reprieves, the Court classified deferral of execution due to insanity
as a privilege, not a right.2 9 The Court decided, therefore, the fourteenth amendment due process clause did not impose constitutional procedural requirements
on state post-conviction sanity evaluations.2 "
Over the past two decades, the Court expanded considerably its application
of the due process clause to state post-conviction criminal procedures.31 In Morrisse , v. Brewer,32 the Court rejected the right/privilege dichotomy3 3 and held
procedural protections are required whenever an individual may suffer serious
loss of liberty or property due to government action.3 4 In Morrissey, petitioner
asserted that revocation of his parole without a hearing violated procedural due
process3 5 The Court found a parolee is not entitled to all of the rights available
36
to a criminal defendant on trial, because a parolee has been validly convicted.
However, the parolee deserved certain minimum requirements of constitutional
due process. 7
To determine the extent of process required, the Morrissey Court weighed

26. Id. at 13. The Court noted that suggesting insanity after sentencing is only an appeal
to the conscience of the particular court. Id.; see also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 407 (1897)
(plea of insanity after sentencing was an appeal to the court's humanity).
27. 339 U.S. at 13. The Court noted that it did not offend due process to allow the governor
to determine a convict's sanity. Id.
28. Id. at 12; see also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897) (If a jury trial were
required on the issue of insanity, "it would be wholly at the will of a convict to suffer any
punishment whatever, for the necessity of his doing so would depend solely upon his fecundity in
making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed by trial upon trial."); Caritativo, 357
U.S. at 551 ("It is a legitimate consideration . . . to take into account that an adversary proceeding
on the issue of probable cause [of insanity] might open the door to interminable delaying maneuvers
in capital cases ..
").
29. 339 U.S. at 11. The Court characterized a deferral as an "act of grace" comparable to
a sentence reprieve that is not subject to due process requirements. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra notes 31-70 and accompanying text.
32. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
33. Id. at 481 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)). The Court rejected
the notion that constitutional rights turned upon whether the governmental benefit was characterized
as a "right" or "privilege." Id.
34. Id. (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)).
The Court concluded that the potential for the individual to suffer "grievous loss" determines what
procedural protections are due. The Court also cited Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), for
the proposition that due process is accorded if the individual's interest constitutes liberty or property
under the fourteenth amendment. 408 U.S. at 481.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 480. The Court found that parole revocation was not a part of criminal prosecution
so the defendant was not entitled those rights he would have during prosecution. Id.; see also
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1978) (conviction
extinguishes the individual's right to freedom from confinement); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S,
215, 224 (1976) (conviction results in a constitutional deprivation of liberty).
37. Id. at 481; cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (counsel must be provided
at revocation of probation hearings).
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the interests of the parolee, the state, and society.-" The parolee possessed a
strong interest, which arose from statutory parole procedures, in retaining his
liberty.3 9 The state, exercising its police function, had a strong interest in the
efficient return of parole violators to prison. 4 Society had an interest in minimizing incorrect revocation of parole.4 1 Evaluating these interests, the Court
held due process demanded that parole revocation procedures include an informal hearing before an impartial body. 42 The Court reasoned that an informal
hearing is more flexible than a full criminal prosecution.43 Therefore, while the
parolee would have an opportunity to be heard,4 the Court's scheme would
not overburden the state's administrative apparatus. 45 Morrissey thus indicated
certain state post-conviction procedures would be subject to constitutional procedural due process, as determined by an interest-weighing test.
In determining the procedural requirements of the due process clause, the
Court has recognized the unique interest-weighing problems involved with death
penalty cases. 46 In Gardner v. Florida,47 the Court held a convicted murderer is
entitled to certain procedural due process rights at a sentencing hearing. 48 In
Gardner, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder. 49 At defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the death penalty, in part, on the basis
of a confidential report to which the petitioner had no opportunity to respond. 5
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence even though petitioner
had no opportunity to rebut the report. 5 1 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the state procedure did not meet due process require52

ments.

38. 408 U.S. at 483-84; see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) (test used
to determine the process required to establish and continue entitlement to disability benefits under
the Social Security Act); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278 (1970) (interest weighing test applied
to determine the process required prior to revoking welfare benefits).
39. 408 U.S. at 481-82; see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (interests protected
by the fourteenth amendment arise from the due process clause and state statutes).
40. 408 U.S. at 483.
41. Id. at 484.
42. Id. at 488-89. According to the Court, the minimum requirements of due process must
at least include:
a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence
against him; c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence; d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . . ; e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board . . . ; and f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id.
43. Id. at 490.
44. Id. at 488; see also infra text accompanying notes 57-58 & 69-70.
45.

408 U.S. at 490.

46.
47.
48.

See infra note 53.
430 U.S. 349 (1977).
Id. at 362; see also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (sentencing is an important

stage of
49.
50.
51.
52.

a criminal proceeding; therefore, a defendant is entitled to provision of counsel).
430 U.S. at 351.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 362.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/6

4

1986]

Benjamin: Constitutional Law: Extent of Procedural Due Process Required to
CASE COMMENT

The Court recognized the punishment of death is unique because of its
severity and finality.5 3 A convicted prisoner has a fundamental interest in avoiding the death penalty. 4 Consequently, a prisoner has a strong interest in the
disclosure of all relevant information at his sentencing hearing. 5 This interest
outweighed the state's administrative interests in preventing the prisoner from
viewing all the information at his sentencing hearing.5 6 The Court reasoned
that adversarial debate is paramount in the truth-seeking process.57 Therefore,
the state procedure, which did not allow a prisoner to challenge all the evidence
5 8
at a sentencing hearing, failed to comport with due process requirements.
Continuing this trend expanding due process protections for capital offenders,
the Court recently emphasized the value of opposing psychiatric opinions in
the context of capital sanity proceedings.5 9 In Ake v. Oklahoma,60 the Court held
that due process required that an indigent capital defendant, claiming insanity,
have access to psychiatric assistance at the guilt and sentencing stages of trial. 6'
In Ake, petitioner could not afford to hire a psychiatric expert.62 The jury
63
rejected petitioner's insanity defense and convicted him of first degree murder.
The trial court relied on the testimony of the state's psychiatric expert concerning
petitioner's future dangerousness in deciding to sentence petitioner to death. 64
65
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and acknowledged the petitioner's compelling interests in avoiding conviction or, if convicted, of avoiding the
death penalty. 66 The Court also recognized the state's relatively minor financial
interest in not providing psychiatric assistance. 67 The Court emphasized the
high risk of error when only one party supplies psychiatric evidence. 68 Acknowledging that psychiatry is not an exact science, the Court reasoned that
contrasting expert testimony enables the trier of fact to make informed and
more accurate findings. 69 Thus, due process requires that a capital defendant

53.

Id. at 357; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181-88 (1976) (the death penalty

is an "extreme sanction"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability).
54. 430 U.S. at 357-58.
55.

Id. at 360-61; see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (the factfinder in capital

proceedings must have all the relevant information about the defendant); see also Skipper v. South
Carolina, 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986) (in capital proceedings, states may not limit the evidence submitted

to mitigate sentence).
56. 430 U.S. at 358-62.
57. Id. at 360.
58. Id. at 362.
59.
60.

See infra text accompanying notes 60-70.
105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094; see also supra note 53.
105 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
Id. at 1096.
Id.
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have access to psychiatric assistance on relevant issues.70
The instant case presented the issue of whether due process required Florida
to grant a condemned prisoner a post-conviction sanity hearing. The instant
Court found that the eighth amendment gave petitioner the right to defer
execution while insane. 7' Although the Court was split on the extent of process
necessary to protect that right, 72 it found the Florida procedure unconstitu73
tional.
A five-Justice majority held a condemned prisoner had an eighth amendment
right to defer executionwhile insane. 74 The Court considered the common law
tradition and current state practices, both of which did not allow the execution
of insane prisoners. 75 The Court also pointed out that the execution of an insane
prisoner has minimal deterrent and retributive value. 76 Furthermore, executing
a criminal who has no capacity to "come to grips with his own conscience or
77
deity" offends humanity and the Constitution.
In three opinions, seven Justices found the Florida procedure failed to provide petitioner sufficient procedural due process protection. The five-Justice majority held the Florida evaluation process inadequately protected the newlyrecognized constitutional right. 78 Two Justices, O'Connor and White, concurred
in this result and found petitioner possessed a protectable interest that arose
from state statutory, not constitutional, grounds. 79 Justice O'Connor's opinion
found Florida's procedure created a protected interest in deferring execution
while insane, but it did not meet due process requirements. 0 However, seven
Justices, in three opinions, all agreed on one point: the Florida procedure failed
to provide the minimum protection required by due process, the opportunity
to be heard. 81
Beyond this minimum requirement, the seven Justices did not agree on the
particular constitutional inadequacies of the Florida procedure. A four-Justice

70. Id. at 1097.
71. 106 S. Ct. at 2602.
72.
73.

See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.

74. 106 S. Ct. at 2602.
75. Id. at 2600-01. It is settled in the common law and current state statutes that executing
insane defendants is unacceptable, Id.

76. Id. at 2602.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2605-06 (majority opinion); id. at 2611 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

79. Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part); see
also supra text accompanying note 39.

80. 106 S. Ct. at 2611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part).
81. Id. at 2605-06 (majority opinion); id. at 2611 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice dissented, rejecting both the eighth
amendment and due process holdings. They found the Florida procedure faithful to tradition and
practice. Accordingly, neither the Constitution nor state law required more procedure than the
petitioner received. Id. at 2613-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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plurality set down three due process deficiencies in the Florida procedure. 82
First, the plurality denounced the prisoner's inability to participate in the incompetency proceedings.8 3 The plurality emphasized that the heightened need
for reliability in capital proceedings84 and the inconclusive nature of psychiatric
evaluation5 mandated the prisoner be heard. 8t Second, petitioner's inability to
challenge or impeach the state appointed psychiatrists' opinions was unfair for
many of the same reasons cited in Ake.8 7 Finally, the plurality attacked the
88
state's decision to conduct the entire procedure within the executive branch.
The plurality observed that the Governor, as leader of the state prosecutors,
could not be a neutral factfinder. Therefore, the Florida statute, which required
the Governor to determine the competency of a condemned prisoner, was unconstitutional."'

Justice Powell's concurrence and Justice O'Connor's opinion found the Florida procedure constitutionally inadequate for some of the same reasons as the
plurality. Justice Powell denounced the purely executive nature of the sanity
determination and the petitioner's inability to present his arguments to the
decisionmaker. 91 Justice O'Connor found the procedure inadequate solely be' 92
cause the petitioner did not have the "opportunity to be heard.
Although seven Justices found the Florida procedure inadequate, the instant
Court failed to provide a majority opinion that specifically determined the extent
of process required. The plurality opinion did not prescribe specific minimum
procedures to remedy the constitutional infirmities; 93 it did, however, suggest

certain guidelines.

4

The plurality stated that procedures short of a complete

9

trial would suffice. 5 However, the opinion instructed the state to be guided by

its competency statutes, which provide for exhaustive adversarial hearings, no96
tice, an independent psychiatric examination, cross-examination, and counsel.

82. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 2604-05.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2603; see, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984).
85. 106 S. Ct. at 2604; see also Ake, 105 S.Ct. at 1095-97 (because psychiatrists disagree
widely, the factfinder must resolve differences on the basis of the evidence offered by each party).
But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (protection afforded by adversary proceeding
to weigh medical decisions is often illusory).
86. 106 S.Ct. at 2604; see, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (the right
to be heard is a fundamental due process requisite).
87. 106 S. Ct. at 2605.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2605-06. For the text of the pertinent parts of FLA. STAT. § 922.07, see supra note
3.
91. 106 S.Ct. at 2609-10 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
92. Id. at 2612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
93. The plurality specifically left it to the states to develop their own process to comport with
constitutional requirements. Id. at 2605-06.
94. The Court suggested the state use its own procedures, i.e., FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (1986),
for subjecting persons to involuntary commitment. 106 S.Ct. at 2606 n.4.
95. Id. at 2605-06.
96. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (1986).
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The procedure in the plurality opinion contemplated a full sanity trial on the
97
issue of a condemned prisoner's competency.
In concurrence, Justice Powell argued the requirements of due process need
not be as involved as those suggested in the plurality opinion,9 enumerating
three reasons why less process is mandated. First, the issue arises only after a
prisoner has been validly convicted and sentenced to death. 99 Second, because
the petitioner has already been adjudged competent to stand trial, the court
can presume that he remains sane shortly thereafter at the sanity hearing."'
Justice Powell asserted, finally, that adversarial procedures may not be the best
means of determining the subjective medical issue of a prisoner's competency.101
Therefore, according to Justice Powell, an impartial officer or committee that
received evidence and argument from a prisoner's counsel would provide sufficient due process protection. 10 2
Justice O'Connor advocated fewer procedural safeguards than did Justice
Marshall or Justice Powell. 10 3 Voicing the concerns found in early Supreme
Court competency cases, 10 4 Justice O'Connor would not require oral advocacy
or cross examination. 10 Due process, according to Justice O'Connor, required
only that the prisoner be heard, and the prisoner.'s written submissions would
be adequate to meet this requirement. 0 6
The instant case was the first opportunity for the Court to examine a state's
post-conviction competency procedure since the Court applied the eighth amendment to the states. In doing so, it examined the execution of insane prisoners
in light of the due process safeguards provided in cases such as Morrissey, Gardner,
and Ake. Since Solesbee pre-dated the application of the eighth amendment to
the states, the Court could not rely on a change in eighth amendment jurisprudence regarding the execution of an incompetent prisoner. 07 Rather, the
instant Court simply cited, as its rationale, the position of the common law
and the states.' 0 8 Based on this widely recognized restriction on the sovereign
power to execute prisoners while insane, the Court found that the eighth amendment protected insane prisoners faced with capital punishment. 09
Having recognized a constitutional right, the Court reviewed the Florida
procedure in light of a Morrissey-type due process analysis that examined the

97.

106 S. Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2610-11; see also supra note 85.
102. 106 S. Ct. at 2611.
103. Id. at 2611-13.
104. Justice O'Connor stressed the potential for abuse as in Nobles. Id. at 2612; see also supra
notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
105. 106 S. Ct. at 2613.
106. Id.
107. This was the first opportunity the Court had to judge a state's post-conviction competency
procedure since the Court applied the eighth amendment to the states. See supra note 24.
108. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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interests of the parolee, the state, and society. The procedure in the instant
case did not provide the petitioner the opportunity to be heard, the basic due
0
process requirement mandated in Gardner and Ake."1 Therefore, seven Justices
found the procedure inadequate."'
Having struck down post-conviction procedures on due process grounds, the
Court in Morrissey, Gardner, and Ake set forth clear minimum guidelines for the
112
Unlike these cases,
states' legislative, penal and judicial systems to follow.
the instant Court failed to prescribe the specific due process safeguards necessary
to guide state officials in the area of post-conviction incompetency. The instant
Court produced three separate opinions, each of which described the extent of
11 3
process required.
The plurality opinion cited the unique and severe nature of the death penalty,114 discussed in cases such as Gardner, and emphasized the prisoner's constitutional right not to be executed while insane." 5 The plurality found deferring
the execution of the insane furthers society's interests in ensuring that the death
penalty remains a punishment for the condemned. Following this rationale, the
retributive nature of the death penalty is not satisfied when an incompetent is
executed." 6 Accordingly, the plurality implied that a full adversarial hearing on
the petitioner's competency, more extensive than those mandated in Morrissey
or Ake, was required." 7 However, as the Court in Solesbee recognized, full ad8
versarial hearings would result in considerable delay of execution."1 The plurality also did not heed the concern of the Morrissey Court that full adversarial
procedures would over-burden a state's administrative system." 9 Finally, as Justice Powell's concurrence emphasized, formal adversarial procedures are not
20
necessarily the best means to determine the truth of psychiatric issues.' Therefore, a procedure that eliminated these deficiencies while satisfying the demands
of due process would more closely comply with prior Court interest-balancing
decisions.
In Justice O'Connor's view, petitioner, like the Morrissey petitioner, possessed
a limited statutorily created interest.' 21 Against this interest, Justice O'Connor
emphasized the state's interests, voiced in Solebee, in minimizing false claims
and deliberate delay.' 22 Justice O'Connor recommended only that the decision23
maker consider the prisoner's written submissions.' Justice O'Connor's plan

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 78-81.
text accompanying notes 32-70.
notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
text accompanying note 84.
text accompanying note 74.
text accompanying notes 76-77.
text accompanying note 96.
note 28 and accompanying text.
text accompanying note 45.
text accompanying note 101.
text accompanying note 79.
note 104 and accompanying text.
text accompanying note 106.
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failed to give the prisoner an opportunity to challenge the state's expert testimony, as required in Ake. 124 The plan also failed to withdraw the decision
from the exclusive control of the executive branch. 25 Therefore, a state procedure modeled after Justice O'Connor's plan would, presumably, be found
insufficient by a plurality of the Court.
Justice Powell's concurrence applied a Morrissey-type due process analysis
and balanced the constitutional right of a prisoner with the state's legitimate
concerns.1 26 Powell's plari, resembling the Court's scheme in Morrissey, cured
the due process infirmities by calling for an impartial officer or board that could
receive evidence and argument from the prisoner. 2 7 Recognizing the Ake concerns, Justice Powell's scheme permitted the prisoner to submit psychiatric evidence adverse to the state's psychiatric evidence.'
However, Justice Powell
2
acknowledged the complex and inconclusive nature of psychiatric examination. D
In addition, Justice Powell, like the Morrissey Court, recognized the valid conviction of the prisoner and the burden on the state's administrative system of
formal adversarial hearings. 130 Therefore, his opinion would require only an
informal proceeding.' 3 ' Justice Powell's opinion most accurately reflects the
Court's development of post-conviction procedural due process.
Although the Court's eighth amendment ruling seems correct, the Court did
not rely on any change in eighth amendment jurisprudence after Solesbee.132 The
Court admitted its decision was based on expanded notions of procedural due
process. 133 The Florida post-conviction competency procedure failed to provide
the minimal opportunity to be heard, required in Gardner and Ake.134 Therefore,
the procedure was unconstitutional.
The result in the instant case mandates that many states will have to redraft
their procedures for adjudging the competency of the condemned prisoner. 3 '
However, the instant court offered little, or perhaps contradictory, guidance in
the redrafting process, which assures further litigation. The instant Court yielded
three opinions, each of which only vaguely described the extent of due process
required. Within these broad boundaries, states redrafting their post-conviction
competency evaluation statutes will be able to develop their own due process
standards. Justice Powell's due process analysis most adequately balanced the

124. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
125. Petitioner's inability to challenge the state-appointed psychiatrists was one of the three
deficiencies for which the plurality invalidated the Florida procedure. 106 S. Ct. at 2605; see also
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 98-102.
127. See supra notes 42 & 102 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70 & 102.
129, See supra text accompanying note 101.
130. See supra notes 36, 45, 100-01 and accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying note 102.
132. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 31-73 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
135. Many state statutes provide that the governor, sheriff or warden who has custody of the
condemned prisoner decides insanity issues. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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interests of society, state, and prisoner. Therefore, due process most likely requires that a condemned prisoner claiming insanity be provided an informal
hearing with impartial experts and input by the prisoner to adjudge his competency.
MICHAEL BENJAMIN
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